4E’s Are Too Many Why Enactive World-Making Does Not Need The Extended Mind Thesis
JoLMA December 9, 2020 DOI: 10.30687/jolma/2723-9640/2020/02/005 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that a postcognitivist approach to experience does not need the full 4E framework; the enactive body as a sense-making system suffices. |
Abstract
4E’s cognition – embodied, embedded, enacted, extended – replaces the cognitivist notion of world-mirroring with an active process of world-making: cognition needs no mental representation and is distributed over body, brain and environment. In recent years, the remark that extended cognition is not enactive and that the embodied approach to cognition fails to provide a definition of body raise the question of whether a postcognitivist approach to experience needs 4E’s. This contribution suggests that it does not. The enactive body as a moving sense-making-system informed by phenomenology and pragmatism and its role in the constitution of the distinctive quality of an experience are discussed.