This work traces the distinction between idea and nature throughout the history of philosophy, arguing that our understanding of reality has a paradoxical nature that is not directly accessible. The ongoing separation between idea and nature underlies many tensions, including the initial difference between physics and metaphysics. Specific dualities such as inner-outer, self-world, subject-object, being-becoming, and mind-body originate from this distinction. More broadly, the ontological opposition of Idealism-Realism and the epistemological opposition of Rationalism-Empiricism also stem from it.
The enactive view proposes an alternative to classical theories of mind, arguing that human cognition cannot be reduced solely to concrete relations or treated as an abstract process independent of its objects. Instead, cognition should be understood as the intentional relationships an embodied subject forms with objects in the world. This view draws on Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological analyses and his ideas about the body. However, the enactive approach faces two shortcomings: it adopts a natural attitude that invites naturalism critiques from phenomenology due to its reliance on scientific data, and its use of Merleau-Ponty's analyses is insufficient for developing a genuine alternative. To present a truly alternative solution for embodied consciousness, the enactive view must overcome these criticisms.