Algı Kuramı Olarak Yönelimselcilik Aleyhine Bir Argüman
MetaZihin Yapay Zeka ve Zihin Felsefesi Dergisi December 31, 2025 Yavuz Recep Başoğlu
The problem of perception, especially in cases of hallucination and illusion, asks what constitutes phenomenal character when the object we take ourselves to perceive is absent. Intentionalism is often presented as a fourth alternative to sense-datum theory, naïve realism, and adverbialism. This article argues that intentionalism does not offer a genuinely distinct solution to the problem of perception. Any solution it can provide reduces to options already available to non-intentional theories. The argument follows the distinction between approaches that accept a direct object (or an entity constituting phenomenal character) and those that reject such an object.