Humanities & Social Sciences Communications
June 14, 2026
Juanjuan Cheng
Abstract This paper advances and defends an inclusive functionalist conception of perception, according to which any cognitive process that involves information selection, representation—understood in a functional sense as an internal state that carries information about the world and guides behavior and cognition independently of its phenomenal properties—and behavioral guidance qualifies as...
Humanities & Social Sciences Communications
March 2, 2025
Corina Yu Zhao
Abstract This paper explores the integration of eastern philosophical practices, particularly Self-Enquiry, into contemporary psychotherapy. It begins by examining various philosophical traditions’ views on the self, contrasting eastern and western perspectives. Self-Enquiry, rooted in Indian Vedantic philosophy, offers a unique pathway to psychological well-being by encouraging individuals to...
Humanities & Social Sciences Communications
December 8, 2024
Ljubiša Bojić, Irena Stojković, Zorana Jolić Marjanović
Abstract The emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) is transforming how humans live and interact, raising both excitement and concerns—particularly about the potential for AI consciousness. For example, Google engineer Blake Lemoine suggested that the AI chatbot LaMDA might become sentient. At that time, GPT-3 was one of the most powerful publicly available language models, capable of...
Humanities & Social Sciences Communications
February 7, 2021
Philip Z. Maymin, Ellen J. Langer
Abstract In a study testing whether mindfulness decreases cognitive biases, respondents answered 22 standard cognitive bias questions to measure susceptibility to the endowment effect, overconfidence, mental accounting, anchoring, loss aversion, and 17 other biases, as well as the 14 questions of the Langer mindfulness survey (LMS), measuring the traits of novelty-seeking, novelty producing,...
Humanities & Social Sciences Communications
December 7, 2020
Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira
Abstract How does one know the phenomenal character of one’s own experience? I aim to present and defend a new view of the epistemology of qualia that addresses this issue. My view results from a reworking of Dretske’s displaced perception model. The guiding line is the key Wittgensteinian insight of his Private Language Argument, namely the claim that no inner perception of qualia can justify...