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Michel Bitbol

4 papers in the library · 207 citations · publishing 2008-2022

Papers

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The Roles Ascribed to Consciousness in Quantum Physics

Consciousness and Quantum Mechanics July 18, 2022 Michel Bitbol

AbstractTwo questions standardly arise about the connections between quantum mechanics and consciousness: “how can consciousness impose a reduction of the physical system’s quantum state?”; and, conversely, “how can consciousness be produced by a quantum process?”. In this paper, such questions are not answered, but considered as symptoms of a cultural bias. Indeed, they involve two terms,...

Neurophenomenology of surprise

Consciousness & Emotion Book Series November 6, 2019 Michel Bitbol 2 citations

Abstract A theory of the central nervous system was formulated recently, in general thermodynamical terms. According to it, the function of a central nervous system, and more generally of living autopoietic units, is to minimize “surprise”. The nervous system fulfills its task, and the animal maintains its viability, by changing their inner organization or their ecological niche so as to...

Studying the experience of meditation through Micro-phenomenology

Current Opinion in Psychology October 25, 2018 Claire Petitmengin, Martijn van Beek, Michel Bitbol et al. 163 citations

Numerous scientific studies are conducted on the neurophysiological effects of meditation practices and on the neural correlates of meditative states. However, very few studies have been conducted on the experience associated with contemplative practice: what it is like to meditate - from moment to moment, at different stages of different forms of practice - remains almost invisible in...

Is Consciousness Primary?

NeuroQuantology February 22, 2008 Michel Bitbol 42 citations

Abstract: Six arguments against the view that conscious experience derives from a material basis are reviewed. These arguments arise from epistemology, phenomenology, neuropsychology, and philosophy of quantum mechanics. It turns out that any attempt at proving that conscious experience is ontologically secondary to material objects both fails and brings out its methodological and existential...