The Roles Ascribed to Consciousness in Quantum Physics

The paper argues that standard questions linking quantum mechanics and consciousness—such as how consciousness could cause a quantum state reduction or how a quantum process could produce consciousness—reflect a cultural bias toward dualism. Adopting the monistic standpoint of phenomenology, it contends that consciousness is not a thing or property that exists but a precondition for any ascription of existence. From this view, several quantum conundrums, especially the measurement problem and state reduction, dissolve when using a phenomenology-compatible interpretation like QBism, which starts from a first-person standpoint.

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Abstract

AbstractTwo questions standardly arise about the connections between quantum mechanics and consciousness: “how can consciousness impose a reduction of the physical system’s quantum state?”; and, conversely, “how can consciousness be produced by a quantum process?”. In this paper, such questions are not answered, but considered as symptoms of a cultural bias. Indeed, they involve two terms, consciousness and physical systems, which make the mental attractor of dualism irresistible. As an antidote, the monistic standpoint of phenomenology is adopted. According to phenomenology, consciousness is no thing or property that may exist, but a misleading name for the precondition for any ascription of existence. Several standard conundrums of quantum mechanics are revisited from this standpoint. In particular, the measurement problem (with its concept of state reduction) is immediately dissolved if one adopts a phenomenology-compatible interpretation of quantum mechanics. This is the case of QBism, which starts everything afresh from a first-person standpoint.