A missing ingredient called 'perspectivalness' is proposed as necessary for consciousness to arise from neural activity, alongside temporal duration and information content. This component guides the formation of a 'Central Representation' present in all mammals and extended in humans to support both phenomenal and self-consciousness. Experimental evidence links perspectivalness to buffer working memory sites in the inferior parietal lobes, which act as attentional coordinators on spatial maps. The article reviews difficulties among existing approaches to consciousness and discusses open questions.
A theoretical paper examines how certain neural network features in the cerebral cortex might help bridge the explanatory gap between phenomenal consciousness and correlated brain activity. The authors propose criteria that neural activity must meet to be associated with phenomenal consciousness, review various neural processing styles, and identify one style—semiautonomous, long-lasting cortical activity "bubbles" triggered by input—as the best fit. Further experimental criteria narrow the candidate neural models, leading to a specific class of models and a set of testable predictions about the neural underpinnings of phenomenal consciousness.
Evidence from fMRI, MEG, and EEG recordings shows a neural signal occurring about 200 milliseconds after a stimulus appears, located mainly in parietal and extra-striate visual areas, which appears to be a copy of the command that shifts attention. This signal, termed a corollary discharge of attention movement, is observed before subjects report their conscious experience. The authors suggest this finding offers a promising path for investigating the link between attention control signals and human consciousness.