What it is like to be a bit: an integrated information decomposition account of emergent mental phenomena
Neuroscience of Consciousness November 1, 2021 Andrea I. Luppi, Pedro A. M. Mediano, Fernando E. Rosas et al. 42 citations
Consciousness can be better understood by decomposing it into distinct information-theoretic elements rather than measuring it as a single quantity of integrated information. The authors propose Integrated Information Decomposition (ΦID), which provides a formal argument that whether consciousness is an emergent phenomenon depends on its information-theoretic composition. Two organisms may have the same amount of integrated information yet differ in composition. A new measure, ΦR, and the ΦR-ing ratio quantify how efficiently information is used for conscious processing. This approach enables identification of qualitatively different 'modes of consciousness' and mapping them to phenomenology, starting with selfhood. ΦID offers new ways to explore the relationship between information, consciousness, and neural dynamics.