We attempt in this article to formulate a conceptual and testable framework weaving Cosmos, Mind and Matter into a whole. We build on three recent discoveries, each requiring more evidence: i. The particles of the Standard Model, SU(3) x SU(2) x U(1), are formally capable of collective autocatalysis. This leads us to ask what roles such autocatalysis may have played in Cosmogenesis, and in...
If all aspects of the mind-brain relationship were adequately explained by classical physics, then there would be no need to propose alternatives. But faced with possibly unresolvable puzzles like qualia and free will, other approaches are required. In alignment with a suggestion by Heisenberg in 1958, we propose a model whereby the world consists of two elements: Ontologically real Possibles...
Abstract We approach the question ‘What is consciousness?’ in a new way, not as Descartes’ ‘systematic doubt’, but as how organisms find their way in their world. Finding one’s way involves finding possible uses of features of the world that might be beneficial or avoiding those that might be harmful. ‘Possible uses of X to accomplish Y’ are ‘affordances’. The number of uses of X is indefinite...
We approach the question "What is Consciousness?" in a new way, not as Descartes' "systematic doubt", but as how organisms find their way in their world. Finding one's way involves finding possible uses of features of the world that might be beneficial or avoiding those that might be harmful. "Possible uses of X to accomplish Y" are "Affordances". The number of uses of X is indefinite (or...
I wish to discuss a large, interwoven set of topics pointed at in the title above. Much of what I say is highly speculative, some is testable, some is, at present, surely not. It is, I hope, useful, to set these ideas forth for our consideration. What I shall say assumes quantum measurement is real, and that Bohm's interpretation of Quantum Mechanics is not true. The Stalemate: In our...
Since Descartes' dualism, with his res extensa and res cogitans, six fundamental problems in the philosophy and natural history of mind are these: 1. how does mind act on matter? 2. If mind does not act on matter is mind a mere epiphenomenon? 3. What might be the source of free will? 4. What might be the source of a responsible free will? 5. Why might it have been selectively advantageous to...