The cognitive functions of human and nonhuman primates rely on the dynamic interplay of distributed neural assemblies. As such, it seems unlikely that cognition can be supported by macroscopic brain dynamics at the proximity of equilibrium. We confirmed this hypothesis by investigating electrocorticography data from nonhuman primates undergoing different states of unconsciousness (sleep, and...
The cognitive functions of human and non-human primates rely on the dynamic interplay of distributed neural assemblies. As such, it seems unlikely that cognition can be supported by macroscopic brain dynamics at the proximity of thermodynamic equilibrium. We confirmed this hypothesis by investigating electrocorticography data from non human primates undergoing different states of...
Consciousness transiently fades away during deep sleep, more stably under anesthesia, and sometimes permanently due to brain injury. The development of an index to quantify the level of consciousness across these different states is regarded as a key problem both in basic and clinical neuroscience. We argue that this problem is ill-defined since such an index would not exhaust all the relevant...
Global brain states are frequently placed within a unidimensional continuum by correlational studies, ranging from states of deep unconsciousness to ordinary wakefulness. An alternative is their multidimensional and mechanistic characterization in terms of different cognitive capacities, using computational models to reproduce the underlying neural dynamics. We explore this alternative by...