Skip to content

Consciousness & Emotion

ISSN 1566-5836

5 papers in the library · 8 citations · publishing 2001-2003

Papers

Sort Most recent Most cited

The fiction of phenomenal intentionality

Consciousness & Emotion December 31, 2003 Nicholas Georgalis 8 citations

This paper argues that there is no such thing as “phenomenal intentionality”. The arguments used by its advocates rely upon an appeal to “what it is like” (WIL) to attend on some occasion to one’s intentional state. I argue that there is an important asymmetry in the application of the WIL phenomenon to sensory and intentional states. Advocates of “phenomenal intentionality” fail to recognize...

Spinoza’s anticipation of contemporary affective neuroscience

Consciousness & Emotion December 31, 2003 Heidi Morrison Ravven

Spinoza speculated on how ethics could emerge from biology and psychology rather than disrupt them and recent evidence suggests he might have gotten it right. His radical deconstruction and reconstruction of ethics is supported by a number of avenues of research in the cognitive and neurosciences. This paper gathers together and presents a composite picture of recent research that supports...

Phenomenal, access and reflexive consciousness

Consciousness & Emotion December 31, 2002 Bill Faw

This paper adds five “blocks” (cells) to Ned Block’s 2-by-2 P- and A-Consciousness typology, by converting “phenomenal” and “access” into two orthogonal dimensions of Primary Conscious, and by introducing gradations along each dimension, with P0 (no phenomenal experience), P1 (attenuated phenomenal experience), and P2 (full phenomenal experience); and A0 (no access of mental content to either...

On the intrinsic nature of states of consciousness

Consciousness & Emotion September 5, 2002 Thomas Natsoulas

What are the states of consciousness in themselves, those pulses of mentality that follow one upon another in tight succession and constitute the stream of consciousness? William James conceives of each of them as being, typically, a complex unitary awareness that instantiates many features and takes a multiplicity of objects. In contrast, Brian O’Shaughnessy claims that the basic durational...

Feeling as knowing — Part II

Consciousness & Emotion November 16, 2001 Timo Järvilehto

In the latter part of this two-article sequence, the concept of emotion as reorganization of the organism-environment system is developed further in relation to consciousness, subjective experience and brain activity. It is argued that conscious emotions have their origin in reorganizational changes in primitive co-operative organizations, in which they get a more local character with the...