AbstractThis chapter attempts to discover the minimal neural mechanisms jointly sufficient for any one conscious sensation or percept, the neuronal correlates of consciousness (NCC). It raises a series of questions which cover some of the subproblems that are likely to bear on the NCC, and focuses on the visual system of humans and macaque monkeys.
Here we summarize our present approach to the problem of consciousness. After an introduction outlining our general strategy, we describe what is meant by the term 'framework' and set it out under ten headings. This framework offers a coherent scheme for explaining the neural correlates of (visual) consciousness in terms of competing cellular assemblies. Most of the ideas we favor have been...
Koch 1990) that outlined a sketch of such a theory. Our aim was not to produce as complete a theory of con-sciousness as possible but to indicate promising lines of experimental work, mainly neurobiological, that might lead eventually toward a solution of the problem. We made the plausible assumption that all forms of con-sciousness (e.g., seeing, thinking, and pain) employ, at bottom, rather...