A Critical Study: Physical Closure and the Argument for Naturalism
Pizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī April 17, 2022 Nima Narimani
The author argues that the principle of Physical Causal Closure (P.C.), which holds that only physical causes produce natural events, is used by naturalist philosophers to argue against supernatural causation and God. However, the author contends that P.C. also undermines human mental causation and agency. The paper examines four physicalist approaches—anomalous monism, non-reductive physicalism, over-determination, and reductive physicalism—that attempt to reconcile mental causation with P.C. The author claims each approach fails, demonstrating that P.C. leads to absurd consequences and thus cannot serve as a valid premise for naturalism. Consequently, the best argument for naturalism fails and does not refute theism.