This paper is a preliminary version that has been replaced by a later formal axiomatic development. The later work argues that computational consciousness is impossible, presenting a formal axiomatic system and a mechanized meta-trilemma proving that normatively complete computational consciousness cannot exist.
A formal argument, verified in the Coq proof assistant, challenges the idea that consciousness can be fully explained by computation. Using higher-order type theory and philosophically motivated axioms about semantics, normativity, epistemic limits, and finite computational bounds, the framework derives a meta-computational subject-functor that no finite system can realize. Three theorems and a trilemma result: accepting the conclusions implies consciousness is meta-computational; rejecting cognitive axioms leads to eliminativism; rejecting computational axioms forfeits closure. Naturalistic objections are addressed, showing they presuppose the subject-functor they deny. The work offers a mechanized philosophical argument against reductive computational accounts of consciousness.
Consciousness cannot be identified with any purely computational structure, because any computational description treats it as an object, yet the subjective standpoint of an experiencing subject is logically prior to and presupposed by any such description. A minimal formal axiomatic system is introduced that strictly separates a subject-type S (experiencing consciousness) from an object-type O (all computable, objective states). Within this framework, three theorems are demonstrated: it is logically impossible to reduce consciousness to computation; any attempt to deny or explain away the subject already presupposes it; and the subject is ontologically prior to all objective manifestations. Machines are not excluded from consciousness because they are too simple, but because any wholly computational description can only model consciousness as an object, never capturing the subjective standpoint required for such modeling.
The Charta Theory framework yields three testable predictions about consciousness: placebo efficacy has a 42% ceiling, verified near-death experiences during cardiac arrest show a 0.5–2 Hz EEG peak, and self-referential cognitive tasks exhibit non-Markovian memory effects. These falsifiable claims distinguish the theory from emergentist models and can be tested with existing tools like EEG kits and psychopharm datasets. The paper is the third in a four-part series developing a metalogical solution to the hard problem of consciousness.