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Beyond Computation: A Formalized Meta-Trilemma Mechanized Philosophical Argument

Meister, Siegfried

PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) December 16, 2025 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17968850 (opens in new tab) via OpenAlex

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

A formal argument, verified in the Coq proof assistant, challenges the idea that consciousness can be fully explained by computation. Using higher-order type theory and philosophically motivated axioms about semantics, normativity, epistemic limits, and finite computational bounds, the framework derives a meta-computational subject-functor that no finite system can realize. Three theorems and a trilemma result: accepting the conclusions implies consciousness is meta-computational; rejecting cognitive axioms leads to eliminativism; rejecting computational axioms forfeits closure. Naturalistic objections are addressed, showing they presuppose the subject-functor they deny. The work offers a mechanized philosophical argument against reductive computational accounts of consciousness.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Argument complex analysis Impossibility Axiomatic system Normative Consistency knowledge bases
Key finding Argues that a meta-computational subject-functor necessarily emerges from the axioms, which no finite computational system can realize, thereby challenging pure computationalism.

Abstract

This paper has been radically extended by the formal and coq verified axiomatic development in: Beyond Computation 2.0: Verified Meta-Trilemma - Mechanized Impossibility of Normatively Complete Computational Consciousness This paper presents a formalized meta-trilemma challenging pure computationalism using higher-order type theory, fully mechanized in Coq. Philosophically motivated axioms capture semantic variety, normative correctness, epistemic insight into formal limits, and finite computational bounds. From these, a meta-computational subject-functor necessarily emerges that no finite system can realize. The framework yields three theorems and a trilemma: accepting the results implies consciousness is meta-computational; rejecting cognitive axioms leads to eliminativism; rejecting computational axioms forfeits closure. A section anticipates naturalistic objections, showing substantive critique performatively presupposes the subject-functor it denies. Coq verifies internal consistency and derivability. Alternative weaker formulations are discussed. The work offers a mechanized philosophical argument against reductive accounts of consciousness, compatible with physical closure. The coq repository can be downloaded at https://github.com/ChartaTheory/Charta-Research-Coq-Proofs

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