Beyond Computation: A Formalized Meta-Trilemma Mechanized Philosophical Argument
PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) December 16, 2025 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17968850 (opens in new tab) via OpenAlex
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractA formal argument, verified in the Coq proof assistant, challenges the idea that consciousness can be fully explained by computation. Using higher-order type theory and philosophically motivated axioms about semantics, normativity, epistemic limits, and finite computational bounds, the framework derives a meta-computational subject-functor that no finite system can realize. Three theorems and a trilemma result: accepting the conclusions implies consciousness is meta-computational; rejecting cognitive axioms leads to eliminativism; rejecting computational axioms forfeits closure. Naturalistic objections are addressed, showing they presuppose the subject-functor they deny. The work offers a mechanized philosophical argument against reductive computational accounts of consciousness.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Argument complex analysis Impossibility Axiomatic system Normative Consistency knowledge bases |
| Key finding | Argues that a meta-computational subject-functor necessarily emerges from the axioms, which no finite computational system can realize, thereby challenging pure computationalism. |
Abstract
This paper has been radically extended by the formal and coq verified axiomatic development in: Beyond Computation 2.0: Verified Meta-Trilemma - Mechanized Impossibility of Normatively Complete Computational Consciousness This paper presents a formalized meta-trilemma challenging pure computationalism using higher-order type theory, fully mechanized in Coq. Philosophically motivated axioms capture semantic variety, normative correctness, epistemic insight into formal limits, and finite computational bounds. From these, a meta-computational subject-functor necessarily emerges that no finite system can realize. The framework yields three theorems and a trilemma: accepting the results implies consciousness is meta-computational; rejecting cognitive axioms leads to eliminativism; rejecting computational axioms forfeits closure. A section anticipates naturalistic objections, showing substantive critique performatively presupposes the subject-functor it denies. Coq verifies internal consistency and derivability. Alternative weaker formulations are discussed. The work offers a mechanized philosophical argument against reductive accounts of consciousness, compatible with physical closure. The coq repository can be downloaded at https://github.com/ChartaTheory/Charta-Research-Coq-Proofs