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Performative Self-Reference and the Metalogical Impossibility of Computational Consciousness

Siegfried Meister

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) December 3, 2025 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17800073 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Impossibility Performative utterance Consciousness Axiomatic system Computational model Epistemology Development topology Mathematical economics
Citations 2
Key points Argues that computational consciousness is metalogically impossible, supported by a formal axiomatic development and a verified meta-trilemma.

Abstract

This paper has been superseded and radically extended by the formal axiomatic development in: Performative Self-Reference and the Metalogical Impossibility of Computational Consciousness: A Formal Axiomatic Development And: Beyond Computation 2.0: Verified Meta-Trilemma - Mechanized Impossibility of Normatively Complete Computational Consciousness