Global subject pressure in nontheistic idealism
Religious Studies July 7, 2026 John Alton Christmann
Helen Yetter-Chappell defends a nontheistic idealism in which physical reality is a phenomenal tapestry held together by unity-of-consciousness relations, without requiring a divine perceiver. This paper argues that her position cannot avoid anti-subjectivism without positing a globally unifying subject-like ground. Two arguments show the pressure: the instability of her preferred Thin Mind view and the lack of an adequate ground for the synchronic pattern of co-consciousness relations. Among the ways to realize a global subject, theistic idealism is superior because alternatives like cosmopsychism, primitive phenomenal field views, neutral monism, and impersonal cosmic subject views leave at least one pressure unresolved. Using Yetter-Chappell's own comparative methodology, theistic idealism has the advantage on criteria of intelligibility, explanation, and perceptual contact.