This paper develops a new position in the metaphysics of consciousness: a serial and liminal cosmopsychism. Standard cosmopsychism (priority cosmopsychism; Bernardo Kastrup's analytic idealism) treats the cosmic subject as prior and already complete, and so faces the decombination problem — how one cosmic consciousness divides into the many private subjects we observe. The paper reverses that...
Contemporary cosmopsychism—including priority cosmopsychism (Shani; Nagasawa and Wager) and Bernardo Kastrup's analytic idealism—treats the cosmic subject as prior and actual, and so inherits the decombination problem: How does one complete cosmic consciousness divide into many private subjects? This essay argues that the difficulty stems from a tacit temporal assumption—that the One precedes...
Contemporary cosmopsychism—including priority cosmopsychism (Shani; Nagasawa and Wager) and Bernardo Kastrup's analytic idealism—treats the cosmic subject as prior and actual, and so inherits the decombination problem: how does one complete cosmic consciousness divide into many private subjects? This essay traces the difficulty to a tacit temporal assumption—that the One precedes the many—and...