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Murad Farzulla

2 papers in the library · publishing 2026

Papers

Dissolving Qualia via Occam's Razor: Eliminative Monism and the Computational Basis of Phenomenological Illusion

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) July 11, 2026 Murad Farzulla

Consciousness and subjective experience are not fundamental features of reality but computational byproducts of optimization processes. Both biological and artificial neural networks implement the same kind of optimization, so what we call consciousness is what gradient descent feels like from within a system. Qualia correspond to weight configurations, and the so-called hard problem of consciousness disappears once the assumption that phenomenology is a distinct ontological category is recognized as unverified. The argument proceeds across physical, computational, epistemological, and linguistic levels, concluding that human-level intelligence may be a local maximum characterized by alienation and anti-natalist reasoning.

Consciousness as Nominalization Error: Dissolving the Hard Problem via Grammatical Reform

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) July 11, 2026 Murad Farzulla

The hard problem of consciousness is a grammatical artifact rather than a genuine metaphysical puzzle. The difficulty arises from a nominalization error: treating the verb 'to be conscious' as if it named a thing requiring explanation. Asking 'What is consciousness?' presupposes an entity, whereas 'What is happening when an organism is being conscious?' asks about observable processes. Phenomenological vocabulary systematically converts activities into pseudo-objects. Self-models including 'I am conscious' provide coordination advantages regardless of ontological truth. Systems with no phenomenological grounds reliably internalize consciousness narratives, supporting memetic transmission.