Abstract Speed of consciousness results may contribute to the popular notion that our consciousness is inefficacious. I argue that Fleming and Michel’s claim that consciousness is slow, coupled with their idea that consciousness marks a predictive world model, instead supports a view of agency in which we are consciously engaged with the world as it unfolds, both in perception and response.
The target article by Van Gyseghem et al. (2026) surveys discussions of consciousness in papers involving human brain organoids (HBOs). They rightly point out that there are many divergent concepts...
did consciousness evolve? Assuming that some species (e.g. humans) have consciousness and others (e.g. redwoods or mushrooms) do not, what problem(s) did consciousness evolve to solve? From a biological and evolutionary viewpoint, and regardless of which species have consciousness (or to what degree), this question of the adaptive function(s) of consciousness is central. Nonetheless, the...
In 1983 Benjamin Libet and colleagues published a paper apparently challenging the view that the conscious intention to move precedes the brain's preparation for movement. The experiment initiated debates about the nature of intention, the neurophysiology of movement, and philosophical and legal understanding of free will and moral responsibility. Here we review the concept of "conscious...
Shepherd (2023) is concerned about the moral status of nonhumans and argues that consciousness-based approaches to moral status are inadequate to guide policy decisions. Consciousness-based approac...
Findings demonstrating decision-related neural activity preceding volitional actions have dominated the discussion about how science can inform the free will debate. These discussions have largely ignored studies suggesting that decisions might be influenced or biased by various unconscious processes. If these effects are indeed real, do they render subjects' decisions less free or even unfree?...