O Erro de David Chalmers: Porque o dualismo de propriedades está errado?
Ricardo Serrado
Controvérsia December 30, 2025 DOI: 10.4013/con.2025.213.13 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that three problems undermine Chalmers' property dualism: non-physical properties cannot be shown to exist or interact in a physical universe; the philosophical zombie argument is conceptually naive, logically inconsistent, and empirically implausible; and Mary's room reflects an epistemological limitation of third-person description rather than an ontological challenge to physicalism. |
Abstract
This article aims to present David Chalmers’ theory of property dualism and to identify a set of conceptual problems that, in our view, undermine this philosophy of consciousness. We begin by outlining the core aspects of Chalmers’ proposal, focusing on his three central principles: structural coherence, organizational invariance, and the dual aspect of information. Subsequently, we analyze and discuss three major objections to property dualism: (1) the problem of non-physicality, which questions whether non-physical properties can exist and interact in a universe governed entirely by physical laws;(2) the problem of the philosophical zombie, which we argue is conceptually naive, logically inconsistent, and empirically implausible, as it underestimates the functional role of phenomenological consciousness in learning, perception, and decision-making; and(3) the problem of Mary’s room, which we interpret not as an ontological challenge to physicalism, but as an epistemological limitation in accessing first-person experience through third-person descriptions.