The Event and the Problem of Time-consciousness

Abstract

The event comes about suddenly and unpredictably, changing everything in our life; afterwards nothing will ever be the same. The time of its arrival can hardly be determined: Once we become aware of the metamorphosis, it has already happened. Although the event opens up a new future for us, it appears as a kind of past, therefore the meaning of the event is only accessible from its own posterity. The event seems to be quite a unique phenomenon with a rather complex temporality. What is the reason for that? In order to reply, we have to look at the different layers of its ‘constitution’. If it is true that first we grasp the sense of the event at the level of pure affects (spontaneous understanding) and only then can we find out its meaning through reason (reflection, cognition, interpretation), we have to draw the consequences with regard to time-consciousness in general. Naturally, we use words and expressions (such as metaphors) related to time, space, and movement in order to depict the quality (affectivity, intensity, direction) of our experiences. However, is it legitimate to link the description of phenomena with the dimension of time? This problem has been present since the foundation of phenomenology. Although Husserl puts the world time into brackets, he does not suspend the ‘existence’ of time as such, hence the notion of time is presupposed, so it is the horizon of time including its continuity and linear movement. I will argue that in the sphere of primordial impressions simply there is no time, as the lived experiences of originally affective nature are not temporal but have intensity. Consequently, to apprehend the temporality of the event, we can say at most that its genesis takes place in an affective ‘time’, which by contrast is not at all temporal.