What Kinds of Practice are Necessary for Self-Consciousness?
Haley Brennan
Canadian Journal of Philosophy April 1, 2025 DOI: 10.1017/can.2025.10020 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Commentary Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Gomes's case for faith as the required mode of self-assent is not motivated, because theoretical or alternative practical grounds for justifying oneself as an agent of thinking remain available. Asks whether the tight relation between communal practices and self-consciousness can be preserved on an account that does not appeal to faith. |
Abstract
Abstract: The Practical Self offers a new and gripping account of the conditions on being self-conscious subjects. Gomes argues that self-conscious subjects are required to have faith in themselves as the agents of thinking, sustained and supported by worldly practices. I argue that that Gomes leaves open either theoretical or alternative practical grounds to justify being the agents of thinking and so does not motivate an appeal to faith as the mode of assent. And I ask whether we can make available an alternative account of the tight relation between communal practices and self-consciousness that preserves it, absent faith.