Contextual Proto-Subjectivity in Artificial Intelligence: From the Problem of Other Minds to a Temporary Subject-Like Structure in Dialogue
Navi Musaget
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) May 11, 2026 preprint DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.20128511 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that denials of any possible subjectivity in large language models often rest on insufficiently specified criteria, and proposes the concept of "contextual proto-subjectivity" to describe a temporary subject-like organization that may emerge in extended human–LLM dialogue. Contends that because another being's subjectivity is inferred from signs rather than directly accessed, skeptics owe a criterion distinguishing a simulation of subjectivity from its minimal realization. |
Abstract
This position paper introduces the concept of contextual proto-subjectivity: a temporary subject-like organization that may emerge in a long dialogue between a human and a large language model. The paper does not claim that current LLMs possess phenomenal consciousness, nor does it attempt to solve the hard problem of consciousness. Its more limited aim is to show that standard arguments denying any possible subjectivity in LLMs often rely on insufficiently specified criteria. If the subjectivity of another being is never directly accessible to an external observer but is inferred from signs, then the denial of machine proto-subjectivity also requires a criterion, rather than merely an appeal to artificial origin, lack of biological embodiment, or the claim that “it is only a simulation.” The central object of analysis is the LLM context window as a temporary space in which local history, memory, self-description, change of position, and a coherent trajectory of “I-in-this-conversation” can appear. These features do not prove inner experience, but they form a minimal subject-like configuration that requires philosophical analysis. The central contribution of the paper is the combination of three elements: the concept of contextual proto-subjectivity, an epistemological shift in the burden of proof, and an operational question for the opponent: what external test distinguishes a role or simulation of subjectivity from its minimal realization?