Modifying Minds

Abstract

Neurotechnologies increasingly enable the modification of neural processes that underlie mental states, emotions and behavior. This raises the question of how we should be protected against unwanted interference, a debate often framed in terms of rights, such as the rights to bodily and mental integrity. Yet the scope of these rights in this context is not always clear, in part because this presupposes answers to deeper, often tacit, questions: what the contours of the mind are, what makes a person the same agent over time, and when neurotechnologies become integrated into an agent rather than merely a tool one uses. The analysis starts with the right to bodily integrity. Traditional accounts appear to assess the severity of infringements in terms of bodily invasion, touching or alteration. Yet such assessments often implicitly also track functional disruption. Neurotechnologies bring this into sharper relief, as some interventions involve only minor anatomical alteration yet produce significant changes in mental states and behavior. The dissertation argues that infringement severity should therefore not be assessed solely by anatomical metrics, but may also take into account mental and behavioral effects insofar as they indicate functional disruption. The analysis then turns to the right to mental integrity and how its scope depends on how the mind itself is understood. Much of the literature tacitly assumes mind internalism, on which the mind is located wholly within the brain and neurotechnologies appear as especially direct threats. On externalist views, such as the extended mind thesis, the mind may partly consist in external artifacts, so that the right would also cover interference with such artifacts, and some neurotechnologies might themselves become part of the mind rather than external threats to it. The right’s scope is thus conditional on metaphysical commitments. The dissertation then examines closed-loop neurotechnologies, which operate with minimal human intervention and may become tightly integrated into a user’s agency. It introduces agential distinctness as a normative variable and explores whether user and device function as two separate agents, one single agent or a hybrid agent. As integration increases, the conceptual distance that underwrites the notion of ‘mental interference’ may collapse, and the device may no longer count as an external agent capable of infringing mental rights. Next, the dissertation evaluates whether a freestanding right to mental integrity is conceptually necessary. If mental interference is defined as bypassing rational deliberation, autonomy may already explain its wrongness; if it is defined as alienation from one’s mental states, psychological continuity may provide a more precise framework. This does not mean the right is necessarily redundant, but its scope must be carefully delineated. The final substantive chapter turns to the consequences of neurotechnological interference. By altering memories, beliefs or dispositions, neurotechnologies can weaken the psychological connections between a person’s past and present self. Since culpability depends on such connectedness, neurotechnologies used in offender rehabilitation may erode the basis for responsibility for past wrongdoing, making continued punishment less justified. Across its chapters, the dissertation shows that rights-based assessments of neurotechnologies are deeply shaped by background assumptions about mind, agency and interference, so that disagreements about rights may reflect divergent metaphysical commitments rather than moral disagreement. It argues for closer integration between neurotechnology ethics and philosophy of mind, and for greater differentiation in the concept of mental interference. Finally, it questions the assumption that neurotechnologies pose a uniquely unprecedented threat in all contexts: existing rights may already capture much of the normative concern, and novel rights may be justified only where residual harms remain. By making these assumptions explicit, the dissertation aims to contribute to a more fine-grained framework for evaluating neurotechnological interference.