Token-identity, consciousness, and the connection principle

Behavioral and Brain Sciences September 1, 1995 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00040139 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract

Characteristics	Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key points	Argues that Searle's (1990) case for the "Connection Principle" conflates ontological and epistemological claims, and that potential consciousness does not preserve aspectual shape the way actual consciousness does. Contends that Searle's distinction between consciousness of an intentional object and of a mental state fails to rebut the objection that deep unconscious rules cease to be deep when made conscious.

Characteristics

Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed

Key points

Argues that Searle's (1990) case for the "Connection Principle" conflates ontological and epistemological claims, and that potential consciousness does not preserve aspectual shape the way actual consciousness does. Contends that Searle's distinction between consciousness of an intentional object and of a mental state fails to rebut the objection that deep unconscious rules cease to be deep when made conscious.

Abstract

AbstractSearle's (1990) argument for the “Connection Principle” seems to rest on a confusion between ontological and epistemological claims. The potential consciousness of a mental state does not yield the same effect as does its actual consciousness, namely, the preservation of aspectual shape. Searle's distinction between the consciousness of an intentional object and that of a mental state, which is meant to counter the objection that deep unconscious rules cease to be deep once they become conscious, fails to do its appointed task.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Related reading