Intentionality, Artificial Intelligence and the Causal Powers of the Brain

Abstract

It seems to be a common belief that in the future, if not in the present, digital computers are going to be capable of cognitive states, experiences, and consciousness equal in every respect to that which exists in human beings. 1 Not everyone, however, is so optimistic. One such skeptic is John Searle and his Minds, Brains, and Programs 2 represents a direct confrontation between the skeptic and the proponents of machine intelligence. In MBP, Searle presents and then attempts to refute the thesis underlying the research of workers in strong AI (Artificial Intelligence). He then presents what can be called his own view concerning the problem of achieving cognitive states and what sorts of entities can achieve them. The goals of this discussion are to: 1) briefly consider Searle's view on what cognitive states are not (with a focus on understanding), i.e., the refutation of the strong AI thesis, 2) present in as much detail as possible Searle's positive view on cognitive states which turns on the notion of causal powers of the brain, 3) examine what, if any, relevant differences exist between the position of strong AI and Searle's positive view. Once these three goals are met, I hope to conclude that strong AI has been conclusively refuted, that Searle's positive view is both explicable and plausible, and therefore, that (in light of the refutation of strong AI) it is more reasonable to accept Searle's view than to suspend judgment.