Comparing David Chalmer’s and John Searle’s Attitudes Toward Strong Artificial Intelligence

John Searle and David Chalmers hold contrasting views on whether artificial intelligence can possess consciousness. Searle argues that syntax alone, as in current AI, cannot produce genuine understanding or subjective experience, while Chalmers suggests that if a system replicates the functional organization of a conscious mind, it might be conscious. Their disagreement stems from different stances on the relationship between consciousness and matter and the nature of consciousness itself. The article examines these philosophical positions across three dimensions: differences in views on machine learning development, the mind-body problem, and the essence of consciousness.

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Abstract

With the rapid development of artificial intelligence, the public and academic understanding of AI capabilities are also constantly changing. This change has triggered discussions about whether AI can have consciousness, understanding, or subjective experience. The definition of consciousness itself also remains controversial in philosophy and science, further complicating the issue. This article will discuss John Searle and David Chalmers’ thoughts on whether artificial intelligence has consciousness from the three dimensions of the differences between philosophers on the development of machine learning, the relationship between consciousness and matter, and the nature of consciousness, and deeply analyze their thoughts on whether artificial intelligence has consciousness. Conscious views and opinions.