Comparing David Chalmer’s and John Searle’s Attitudes Toward Strong Artificial Intelligence
Ke Li, Jiahe Tian, Beijun Xiong
Journal of Education, Humanities and Social Sciences December 26, 2024 DOI: 10.54097/wmg4xh03 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Cognitive science Psychoanalysis Artificial intelligence |
| Key points | Argues that John Searle and David Chalmers hold contrasting views on whether artificial intelligence can have consciousness, rooted in their different philosophical positions on the nature of consciousness and its relationship to matter. |
Abstract
With the rapid development of artificial intelligence, the public and academic understanding of AI capabilities are also constantly changing. This change has triggered discussions about whether AI can have consciousness, understanding, or subjective experience. The definition of consciousness itself also remains controversial in philosophy and science, further complicating the issue. This article will discuss John Searle and David Chalmers’ thoughts on whether artificial intelligence has consciousness from the three dimensions of the differences between philosophers on the development of machine learning, the relationship between consciousness and matter, and the nature of consciousness, and deeply analyze their thoughts on whether artificial intelligence has consciousness. Conscious views and opinions.