How much work can a quale do?
W P Banks
Consciousness and Cognition September 1996 DOI: 10.1006/ccog.1996.0023 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that qualia cannot function as explanatory tools in theories and cannot be explained by them, leaving them no useful theoretical role. Proposes a functionalist account in which qualia are functionally relevant encodings in both perception and imagery, and imagery is less distinct than perception only because it needs to be, not because it is inherently indistinct. |
Abstract
It is argued that theoretical models cannot use qualia as explanatory tools, and cannot explain them either; thus, there is no way to make qualia do any useful work at all, at least in a theory. However, qualia do occur in both imagery and perception, and this article presents some ways of thinking about qualia from a functional perspective. Imagery differs from perception in its function. It is not a faded copy of perception. It is less distinct than perception because it is only as distinct as it needs to be, not because it is inherently indistinct. Qualia represent functionally relevant encodings whether in perception or imagery. The present approach is functionalist and quite similar to Pam's (1996).
Citations in the library
Cited by 4
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- Consciousness, epilepsy, and emotional qualia. Epilepsy & Behavior September 2005