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Crisis – of Phenomenology

Miguel de Beistegui

Research in Phenomenology May 12, 2026 DOI: 10.1163/15691640-12341593 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Key points Argues that Husserlian phenomenology cannot think history without renouncing its fundamental principles. The author contends that Merleau-Ponty's diagnosis of a double crisis of Western rationality points to a crisis within phenomenology itself, which Fanon, Patočka, and Derrida each emphasize: returning to the lifeworld or "Nature-for-us" only reveals further historical sedimentation, so archaeology and genealogy, not phenomenology or "transcendental geology," are what enable historical critique.

Abstract

This article locates an irreducible point of crisis in phenomenology’s attempt to think historically and critically. Using the notion of crisis as my guiding thread, I show how Husserlian phenomenology cannot think history, or historically, without renouncing its fundamental principles. I focus on Merleau-Ponty’s diagnosis of a double crisis of western rationality – the collapse of its “civilizing” mission at a time of decolonial struggles and the collapse of our relation to Nature through science and technology – in his later writings, and show how they point to a moment of crisis within phenomenology, one that Fanon, Patočka, and Derrida, each in their own way, emphasize and invite us to draw to their logical conclusion: every attempt to overcome such crises by returning to the firm, common foundation of the lifeworld, or “Nature-for-us,” reveals another layer of historical sedimentation. Not phenomenology, or “transcendental geology,” but archaeology and genealogy enable us to reach the standpoint of historical critique.

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