Anthropotechnics and transcendental phenomenology
Damian Kałużny
Argument Biannual Philosophical Journal October 30, 2026 DOI: 10.24917/20841043.16.1.9 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Key points | Argues that Husserl's transcendental phenomenology can be interpreted through Sloterdijk's concept of "anthropotechnics," and that the transformational dimension of the transcendental reduction must encompass the whole domain of human reason and culture rather than an isolated inner subject. Contends that the ambiguity Sloterdijk identifies in Husserl is a structural characteristic of phenomenological investigation and the philosophising subject, not a shift between early and late periods, and that both periods express the philosopher's radical responsibility for humanity. |
Abstract
This paper discusses the possibility of interpreting Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology through the lens of Sloterdijk’s concept of anthropotechnics. The analysis accentuates the parallels between Husserl’s phenomenology and Sloterdijk’s anthropotechnical approach, particularly the significance of the ethical and transformational nature of philosophy in both conceptions. In the first section, emphasis is placed on Sloterdijk’s anthropotechnical interpretation of transcendental phenomenology, according to which phenomenology is an ambiguous stance. For Sloterdijk, the early period of Husserl’s thought can be seen as a re‐establishment of the significance of the unworldly, contemplative mode of living. Conversely, the late period of phenomenology represents an attempt to ground the transcendental subject in the world. The paper argues that, in contrast to Sloterdijk’s perspective, the original transformational dimension of the transcendental reduction cannot be restricted to the isolating subject in an inner enclave, but rather has to encompass the entire domain of human reason and culture. The second section discusses Husserl’s conception of philosophical reduction in the anthropotechnical perspective. It is argued that according to Husserl — both in his early and late works — the phenomenological transformation is characterised by the philosopher’s radical responsibility for humanity. The aforementioned ambiguity of Husserl’s phenomenology is thus not the sign of a shift between early and late periods of his thought. It is rather the structural characteristic inherent in both the phenomenological investigation and the philosophising subject itself. The article highlights the possibility, one not without challenges, of an anthropotechnical interpretation of phenomenology.
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