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From Second‐order Cybernetics to Enactive Cognitive Science: Varela's Turn From Epistemology to Phenomenology

Tom Froese

Systems Research and Behavioral Science October 24, 2011 DOI: 10.1002/sres.1116 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Citations 48
Key points Argues that Varela's turn from epistemology to phenomenology was a natural progression building on ideas already implicit in second-order cybernetics and the biology of cognition. Suggests that rigorous study of conscious experience may help refine theories and systemic concepts of life, mind, and sociality.

Abstract

Varela is well known in the systems sciences for his work on second‐order cybernetics, biology of cognition and especially autopoietic theory. His concern during this period was to find an appropriate epistemological foundation for the self‐reference inherent in life and mind. In his later years, Varela began to develop the so‐called ‘enactive’ approach to cognitive science, which sets itself apart from other sciences by promoting a careful consideration of concrete experiential insights. His final efforts were thus dedicated to finding a pragmatic phenomenological foundation for life and mind. It is argued that Varela's experiential turn—from epistemology to phenomenology—can be seen as a natural progression that builds on many ideas that were already implicit in second‐order cybernetics and biology of cognition. It is also suggested that the rigorous study of conscious experience may enable us to refine our theories and systemic concepts of life, mind and sociality. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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