Free will debates: Simple experiments are not so simple.
W R Klemm
Advances in Cognitive Psychology August 30, 2010 DOI: 10.2478/v10053-008-0073-5 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Review Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Consciousness Free will Libet Compatibilism |
| Key findings | Argues that the claim that free will is an illusion has become dogmatic and that free-will experiments suffer from design limitations and questionable data interpretations. The author catalogs 12 categories of "questionable conclusions" used to promote the illusion view and proposes a next generation of less ambiguous experiments. |
Abstract
The notion that free will is an illusion has achieved such wide acceptance among philosophers and neuroscientists that it seems to be acquiring the status of dogma. Nonetheless, research in this area continues, and this review offers a new analysis of the design limitations and data interpretations of free-will experiments. This review presents 12 categories of questionable conclusions that some scholars use to promote the idea that free will is an illusion. The next generation of less ambiguous experiments is proposed.