Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Scientific Epiphenomenalism.
Alfred Mele
Frontiers in Psychology 2018 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02536 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Libet Wegner Causation Consciousness Epiphenomenalism Free will Intentions Moral responsibility |
| Key points | Argues that the two influential lines of argument for "scientific epiphenomenalism" about conscious intentions - one based on Libet's neuroscientific work and one on Wegner's findings - are both unsuccessful, and links that thesis to skepticism about free will and moral responsibility. |
Abstract
This article addresses two influential lines of argument for what might be termed "scientific epiphenomenalism" about conscious intentions - the thesis that neither conscious intentions nor their physical correlates are among the causes of bodily motions - and links this thesis to skepticism about free will and moral responsibility. One line of argument is based on Benjamin Libet's neuroscientific work on free will. The other is based on a mixed bag of findings presented by social psychologist Daniel Wegner. It is argued that both lines of argument are unsuccessful.