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Searle and Buddhism on the Non-Self

Soraj Hongladarom

Comparative Philosophy An International Journal of Constructive Engagement of Distinct Approaches toward World Philosophy January 30, 2017 DOI: 10.31979/2151-6014(2017).080110 (opens in new tab)

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Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Buddhism
Citations 1
Key points Searle's position, as recounted, is that consciousness surviving bodily death is logically possible but extremely unlikely and is an empirical question for future science, even though he holds consciousness to be a product of the body. Hongladarom argues that Searle's notion of the self as a unified 'point of view' holds only at the conventional level in Buddhist 'Two Truths' thought, not at the ultimate level.

Abstract

In this brief note I continue the discussion that I had with John Searle on the topic of the self and the possibility of continuity of consciousness after death of the body. The gist of Searle's reply to my original paper (Hongladarom 2008) is that it is logical possible, though extremely unlikely, that consciousness survives destruction of the body. This is a rather startling claim given that Searle famously holds that consciousness is the work of the body. Nonetheless, he claims that such issue is an empirical matter which could perhaps be discovered by future science. Another point concerns identity of the self or the person. Searle claims that the self functions as a unified point of view from which episodes of mental events are presented as a coherent picture. Here the Two Truths position in Buddhism differs from Searle's here. The "point of view" that Searle mentions exists only at the conventional level, but not the ultimate one.

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