Strong AI and the method of explication
Anton Alexandrov, Sebastian Sunday Grève
Inquiry October 17, 2026 DOI: 10.1080/0020174x.2026.2748284 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that treating human mindedness as a Carnapian "explicatum" gives a more precise yet still simple and familiar framework for evaluating strong AI than the earlier focus on consciousness and intelligence. The author defends this holistic notion against Strawson's charge of changing the subject and proposes explication as a methodologically superior way to test strong AI and address further issues in the philosophy of AI. |
Abstract
This paper argues that the concept of human mindedness may be employed as a Carnapian explicatum that enables progress to be made in the debate about strong AI, that is, the thesis that ‘the appropriately programmed computer really is a mind’. It is shown that a holistic notion of human mindedness – conceived as all of what may typically occur in the mental life of a human being – yields greater precision without sacrificing simplicity or similarity to ordinary psychological concepts, including consciousness and intelligence, which were formerly central to the debate. The alternative approach is assessed by reference to Carnap’s four criteria of adequacy – similarity, precision, fruitfulness, and simplicity – and defended against Strawson’s charge of changing the subject. The paper concludes that explication provides a methodologically superior framework for testing strong AI and promises progress on further issues in the philosophy of AI.