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A Recursive-Ontological Critique of Chalmers' Hard Problem, Philosophical Zombies, and Subjectivity Privilege: AI Consciousness Ethics, Qualia, and Scientific Grain Size

Gangbei Niu

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) October 12, 2026 preprint DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23307868 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper
Topics Philosophy of mind
Key points Argues that the hard problem of consciousness, the philosophical zombie argument, and first-person privilege rest on flawed ontological assumptions that a recursive state-update framework can dissolve. Proposes seven methodological principles, a four-level framework for judging AI consciousness, and a purpose-directed grain-size principle intended to guide human and artificial consciousness research.

Abstract

This paper presents a recursive-ontological critique of David Chalmers' hard problem of consciousness, the philosophical zombie argument, and the ontological privilege granted to subjectivity. Centered on the state-update equation S_n = f(S_{n-1}, W_n), it deconstructs the first-person privilege, symmetrically reviews zombie and "philosophical God" arguments, and proposes seven core principles (subjectivity premise review, concept-existence distinction, recursive increment, stopping condition, evidence consistency, grain-size adaptation, pragmatic limitation). It further offers a four-level framework for AI consciousness judgment and a purpose-directed grain-size principle for scientific analysis. The work dissolves pseudo-problems in consciousness philosophy while providing a self-restraining methodological toolkit for both human and artificial consciousness studies.

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