Chapter XVII. A critical examination of the concept of "consciousness" in modern artificial intelligence methodology
Andrii Shevtsov
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that alarmist fears about AI waging war on humanity are not supported by fundamental philosophical and psychological research. |
Abstract
Modern approaches to certain methodological psychological and philosophical issues in the field of AI as a science are considered. In particular, such concepts as “artificial consciousness”; “artificial personality”; “strong” and “weak” AI; “easy” and “hard” problems of consciousness; “properties of internal sensory experience (qualia)”, “philosophical zombie”, “machine understanding” are critically described in accordance with the concepts of G.S. Kostyuk, A. Turing, R. Penrose, D. Lucas, D. Chalmers, D. Hoffman, D. Searle, who deny simplified views on consciousness from the point of view of physicalist reductionism. The presented analysis of the current level of AI development shows that alarmist fears about the “war of thinking machines with humanity” are currently not confirmed by fundamental works in the field of philosophy and psychology.