Chapter XVII. A critical examination of the concept of "consciousness" in modern artificial intelligence methodology

The paper critically examines modern psychological and philosophical issues in AI science, including artificial consciousness, artificial personality, strong and weak AI, the easy and hard problems of consciousness, qualia, the philosophical zombie, and machine understanding. It draws on the concepts of G.S. Kostyuk, A. Turing, R. Penrose, D. Lucas, D. Chalmers, D. Hoffman, and D. Searle, who reject simplified physicalist reductionist views of consciousness. The analysis of current AI development indicates that alarmist fears about a war between thinking machines and humanity are not supported by fundamental philosophical and psychological works.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Modern approaches to certain methodological psychological and philosophical issues in the field of AI as a science are considered. In particular, such concepts as “artificial consciousness”; “artificial personality”; “strong” and “weak” AI; “easy” and “hard” problems of consciousness; “properties of internal sensory experience (qualia)”, “philosophical zombie”, “machine understanding” are critically described in accordance with the concepts of G.S. Kostyuk, A. Turing, R. Penrose, D. Lucas, D. Chalmers, D. Hoffman, D. Searle, who deny simplified views on consciousness from the point of view of physicalist reductionism. The presented analysis of the current level of AI development shows that alarmist fears about the “war of thinking machines with humanity” are currently not confirmed by fundamental works in the field of philosophy and psychology.