Bondage Without a Bound Self: Reflection, Discrimination and Liberation in Vācaspati Mishra's Sāṃkhya-Yoga
Kamlesh Kumar Mishra, Rahul Mishra, Kritika Jha
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CREATIVE RESEARCH THOUGHTS June 1, 2026 DOI: 10.56975/ijcrt.v14i10.400512 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Vācaspati Mishra resolves the paradox of an eternally free Puruṣa that nonetheless seeks liberation by relocating bondage and release to Prakṛti, so that bondage ascribed to the self is figurative. On this reading, experience arises through reflection (pratibimba) without change in Puruṣa, ignorance (avidyā) is a positive misapprehension, and discriminative knowledge (viveka-khyāti) brings about the cessation of Prakṛti's activity rather than any transformation of the self. |
Abstract
Purpose: Classical Sāṃkhya-Yoga holds that Puruṣa, pure consciousness, is eternally free, yet it also teaches a path of liberation from bondage. This article asks how Vācaspati Mishra (c. 9th–10th century CE), who commented on both the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā (Tattva-Kaumudī) and the Yoga Bhāṣya (Tattva Vaiśāradī), resolves this apparent paradox. Design/Methodology/Approach: The study offers a textual-hermeneutic reading of the central passages on bondage and release (Sāṃkhya-Kārikā 62 and 67; Yoga Sūtra 2.17, 2.24–2.26, 3.55, 4.29–4.34), interpreted through Vācaspati Mishra's two commentaries and compared with the later critique of Vijñāna Bhikṣu.
Findings: The article argues that Vācaspati Mishra relocates bondage and release from Puruṣa to Prakṛti, so that ascriptions of bondage to the self are figurative. Experience is accounted for by reflection (pratibimba) without change in Puruṣa; ignorance (avidyā) is a positive misapprehension; and discriminative knowledge (viveka-khyāti) is the instrument by which Prakṛti's activity in relation to a given Puruṣa ceases. Liberation is thus coherent as the cessation of a functioning, not the transformation of a self. Originality/Value: By reading the Yoga and Sāṃkhya commentaries as a single argument, the article shows how the apparent paradox of a free self that seeks freedom is handled within a dualist framework, and clarifies what is at stake in the later disagreement between Vācaspati Mishra and Vijñāna Bhikṣu over reflection.