Consciousness as Unity and Relation: Early Modern Philosophy and Classical Sāṃkhya

Abstract

The relevance of the study stems from the difficulties of the cross-cultural application of the concept of con-sciousness, which encompasses both cognitive processes and forms of subjectivity. The article aims to clarify the boundaries of comparing the early modern requirement of the unity of experience with classical Sāṃkhya’s distinction between pure witnessing and mental functions. The study employs historical semantic analysis, functional comparison, and structural reconstruction of Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s Sāṃkhyakārikā together with the com-mentaries of Gauḍapāda and Vācaspati Miśra. The analysis shows that the historical variability impedes a di-rect identification of puruṣa with the thinking subject, yet does not preclude a dialogue between these traditions. It is established that buddhi, ahaṃkāra, and manas perform distinct, coordinated operations, whereas the con-scious principle does not become their active agent. A relational interpretation explains the structure of empiri-cal experience and appropriation of experiences without reducing puruṣa’s independent existence to the result of interaction. The scientific novelty consists in distinguishing the ontological functional, and translational levels of comparison, which allows clarifying the meaning of the formula “consciousness as relation”. The paper sub-stantiates the conclusion that the analysis of the unity and coherence of experience is compatible while pre-serving the differences between philosophical systems. The proposed criteria are applicable to the interpreta-tion of Sanskrit categories in contemporary debates on subjectivity.