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Nāgārjuna and the Recursive Self: A Structural Approach to Emptiness

C. H. Sawyer

Comparative and Continental Philosophy October 18, 2026 DOI: 10.1080/17570638.2026.2741042 (opens in new tab)

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Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that Nāgārjuna's rejection of intrinsic essence (svabhāva) and enactivist/self-model theories' denial of foundational subjectivity share a formal structure, such that the self can be understood as a conventionally operative recursive loop that is structurally empty yet functionally effective. The author contends this reframing supports a processual, non-substantialist ontology and relocates agency within relational, dynamically coupled systems.

Abstract

This essay develops a structural alignment between Nāgārjuna’s concept of śūnyatā (emptiness) and contemporary models of recursive identity in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. While Madhyamaka philosophy rejects the intrinsic essence (svabhāva) of the self, recent enactivist and self-model theories similarly deny foundational subjectivity, treating identity as emergent from recursive processes. Rather than reading Nāgārjuna’s thought as proto-cognitive theory, the analysis proposes a formal isomorphism between his anti-foundational dialectic and the recursive architecture of selfhood in systems theory and phenomenology. On this view, the self is neither a substance nor simply a nonentity, but a conventionally operative looping structure that coheres without ground. This reframing has implications for ontology—suggesting a processual, non-substantialist account of being—and for ethics, repositioning agency within relational, dynamically coupled systems. By bringing Madhyamaka and cognitive theory into conceptual dialogue, the essay offers a cross-cultural philosophical model of selfhood that is structurally empty yet functionally effective.

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