Emptiness, negation, and skepticism in Nāgārjuna and Sengzhao
E. Nelson
Asian Philosophy February 21, 2023 DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2023.2179966 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that emptiness in Madhyamaka is primarily a practical diagnostic and therapeutic concept that dissolves experiential and linguistic reification, leading not to further views or truths but to the suspension of assertion, akin to yet distinct from Ajñāna and Pyrrhonian skepticism. Traces this practice-oriented sense from Nāgārjuna to Sengzhao. |
Abstract
ABSTRACT This paper excavates the practice-oriented background and therapeutic significance of emptiness in the Madhyamaka philosophy attributed to Nāgārjuna and Sengzhao. Buddhist emptiness unravels experiential and linguistic reification through meditation and argumentation. The historical contexts and uses of the word indicate that it is primarily a practical diagnostic and therapeutic concept. Emptiness does not lead to further views or truths but, akin to yet distinct from Ajñāna and Pyrrhonian skepticism, the suspension of assertion. This sense of emptiness as a practice can be traced in the intercultural transmission of Madhyamaka from Nāgārjuna, its paradigmatic philosopher, to Sengzhao 僧肇, its first pivotal indigenous Chinese representative.