Thought Insertion and the Ontology of Thinking
Johannes Roessler
October 1, 2023 DOI: 10.1093/med/9780192896162.003.0017 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Citations | 2 |
| Key points | Argues that the "No Subject" view of awareness—on which one can be aware of a thought without awareness of oneself thinking it—faces a challenge grounded in the ontology of thinking, undermining the standard interpretation of thought insertion. Suggests that if this interpretation fails, the assumption that understanding the delusion requires making sense of it should be questioned. |
Abstract
Abstract On what it will be called the No Subject view, there is a sense in which one may be aware of a thought, conceived as an event in one’s stream of consciousness, without being aware of oneself thinking something. Philosophical work on the delusion of thought insertion is one of the areas in which the No Subject view has been highly influential: the view has framed what, in the philosophy of mind, has become the standard interpretation of the delusion. Here a challenge is presented to the No Subject view, developing from reflection on the ontology of thinking. It will be also considered how, if the standard interpretation fails, thought insertion should be understood. In particular, it will be suggested that the widespread assumption that understanding the delusion has to be a matter of making sense of it should be questioned.
Citations in the library
Cites 4
- Self, Solipsism, and Schizophrenic Delusions Philosophy, psychiatry & psychology June 1, 2001
- Thought insertion and disturbed for-me-ness (minimal selfhood) in schizophrenia. Consciousness and Cognition September 1, 2019
- Experience, Dreaming, and the Phenomenology of Wakeful Consciousness Oxford Scholarship Online June 21, 2018
- Out of nowhere: thought insertion, ownership and context-integration. Consciousness and Cognition March 2013