Mapping the Psychotic Mind: a Review on the Subjective Structure of Thought Insertion.
Psychiatric Quarterly December 2018 DOI: 10.1007/s11126-018-9593-4 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Review Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Delusions Psychosis Thought insertion |
| Key findings | Argues that the experiential features of thought insertion reported by patients fall into two categories: changes preceding the adoption of the delusion and subjective features of full-blown cases. The pre-delusional features have been largely neglected in the literature, and conceptual disagreements about the symptom's phenomenological description must be resolved to build coherent explanatory theories and advance treatment. |
Abstract
Delusions of thought insertion involve subjects claiming that external agents of different nature had placed thoughts into their minds/heads. However, despite being regarded as one of the most severe and complex symptoms of psychotic disorders, a number of disagreements surround the description of its most fundamental phenomenology. This work has reviewed classic and current research on thought insertion in order to examine and clarify its main experiential features as reported by patients from a first-person perspective. The review shows that such features can be grouped into two categories: (i) experiential changes characterizing the period preceding the adoption of the delusion and, (ii) subjective features of full-blown delusional cases. While the discussion of the latter set of experiential features has received some attention within literature, the examination of the former set has been largely neglected. After this, the review offers a discussion of the most important conceptual disagreements surrounding the phenomenological descriptions of the symptom. Overcoming disagreements regarding the experiential structure of thought insertion is fundamental to elaborate phenomenologically and empirically coherent explanatory theories of the symptom and advance its clinical treatment.
Comparable studies
Other narrative reviews on philosophy of mind, most cited first.
| Study | Year | Design | Participants |
|---|---|---|---|
| Body Consciousness: A Philosophy of Mindfulness and Somaesthetics | 2008 | Review article | |
| Phenomenology, Structure, and Dynamic of Psychedelic States | 2016 | Review | |
| Classic Hallucinogens and Mystical Experiences: Phenomenology and Neural Correlates. | 2018 | Review | |
| The lived experience of psychosis: a bottom-up review co-written by experts by experience and academics. Individuals with lived experience of psychosis, family members, and carers | 2022 | Co-written bottom-up review | |
| From autopoiesis to neurophenomenology: Francisco Varela's exploration of the biophysics of being. | 2003 | Review |
Citations in the library
Cited by 4
- Thought insertion and disturbed for-me-ness (minimal selfhood) in schizophrenia. Consciousness and Cognition September 1, 2019
- What are delusions? Examining the typology problem. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science 2024
- Thinking in schizophrenia and the social phenomenology of thought insertion Philosophical Psychology March 26, 2024
- The phenomenology of auditory verbal hallucinations in schizophrenia and the challenge from pseudohallucinations. Frontiers in Psychiatry August 16, 2022
Cites 8
- Psychosis as a state of aberrant salience: a framework linking biology, phenomenology, and pharmacology in schizophrenia. American Journal of Psychiatry 2003
- I Me Mine: on a Confusion Concerning the Subjective Character of Experience. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2017
- The Illusion of Conscious Will The MIT Press September 20, 2018
- Disturbed Consciousness September 11, 2015
- Out of nowhere: thought insertion, ownership and context-integration. Consciousness and Cognition March 2013
and 3 more in the library