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Transcendental Structures in Critical Phenomenology: The Example of Resonance in Hartmut Rosa

David Inczauskis

Puncta October 2, 2026 DOI: 10.61372/puncta.v9i1.3243 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Key points Argues that although critical phenomenologists reject transcendental structures as oppressive, certain versions of them remain important for issuing calls to action. Proposes that Hartmut Rosa treats resonance as a transcendental structure and aggression as a quasi-transcendental structure, and that their interaction grounds a critique of modern world alienation and a guidepost for liberatory praxis.

Abstract

As different as Lisa Guenther (2019, 2021) and Johanna Oksala (2022) may be, they agree that the positing of transcendental structures of meaningful experience leads to oppressive normativity. Their contestation of transcendental structures reflects a trend in recent critical phenomenology that resists phenomenological appeals to transcendental structures in favor of quasi-transcendental ones. While this shift is important for advancing the aims of critical phenomenology, I maintain that certain versions of transcendental structures may nevertheless remain equally important, particularly for issuing calls to action. To illustrate my position, I turn to the phenomenological sociologist Hartmut Rosa, underappreciated in critical phenomenology. In my reading of Rosa, he proposes resonance as a transcendental structure and aggression as a quasi-transcendental structure. Further, he shows how a critique of modern world alienation emerges from an investigation of their interaction, and he provides a meaningful guidepost for liberatory praxis.

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