The mental life of artifacts. Explications, questions, arguments.
W Buschlinger, G Vollmer, H Walter
Zeitschrift fur Naturforschung. C, Journal of biosciences 1998 DOI: 10.1515/znc-1998-7-803 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | The paper argues that the hypothesis that any mental property of a natural system can in principle be exhibited by an artificial system survives examination: after clarifying concepts such as 'natural,' 'artificial,' simulation, and realization, and weighing positive and critical arguments, the authors find no decisive counterargument against it. |
Abstract
Our working assumption reads: Every mental property exhibited by a natural system can be exhibited by an artificial system, at least in principle. Is this true? The paper is in two parts. The first part is explicative: What do we mean by 'natural' or by 'artificial'? When are we ready to ascribe thinking to a system? We show that sometimes behavior is enough, sometimes underlying mechanisms are decisive. We study the difference between simulation and realization of a property and the kinds of explanation used in the philosophy of mind. The second part is argumentative. We collect and discuss positive arguments for and critical arguments against the working hypothesis. No decisive counterargument is found.