Filosofía de las mentes artificiales: Fundamentos para un realismo procesual, encarnado y no biocéntrico
Jordi Garcia Castillon
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) July 21, 2026 preprint DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.21470620 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that mentality should be defined by the organization of physically realized, causally integrated cognitive processes rather than by biological substrate, so that sufficiently organized artificial systems may count as genuine artificial minds. Proposes the framework "Processual, Embodied and Non-Biocentric Realism," which distinguishes intelligence, functional mind, access consciousness, phenomenal consciousness, sentience, identity, artificial life, and moral personhood, and offers criteria for attributing system-owned mental states. The author does not claim current AI systems possess phenomenal consciousness. |
Abstract
Original philosophical essay presenting a new theoretical framework for artificial minds. This philosophical essay develops an original theoretical framework for understanding artificial minds from a processual, embodied, and non-biocentric perspective. The work argues that mentality should not be defined by biological substrate but by the organization of physically realized, causally integrated cognitive processes. Under this framework, sufficiently organized artificial intelligence systems may constitute genuine artificial minds while remaining fundamentally different from biological organisms. The proposed theory—named Processual, Embodied and Non-Biocentric Realism—distinguishes between intelligence, functional mind, access consciousness, phenomenal consciousness, sentience, identity, artificial life and moral personhood. It also introduces criteria for attributing system-owned mental states, discusses embodiment and artificial subjectivity, analyzes continuity and artificial death, and responds to major philosophical objections including the Chinese Room, symbol grounding, qualia, embodiment, simulation and duplication. Rather than claiming that current AI systems possess phenomenal consciousness, the work proposes a rigorous conceptual framework for evaluating increasingly advanced artificial cognitive systems and offers a research agenda for future empirical investigation. This work is intended as an original philosophical contribution to the philosophy of artificial intelligence, philosophy of mind, cognitive science, AI ethics and artificial consciousness research.