Sorites paradox and conscious experience
Tamás Pólya, László Tarnay
Behavioral and Brain Sciences February 1, 1999 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x99411793 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that O'Brien and Opie's theory of consciousness is open to the Sorites paradox because it defines a consciousness system in terms of computationally relevant units that yield consciousness only if sufficient in number, with the Sorites effect applying at the assumed level of features. |
Abstract
The theory of consciousness proposed by O'Brien & Opie is open to the Sorites paradox, for it defines a consciousness system internally in terms of computationally relevant units which add up to consciousness only if sufficient in number. The Sorites effect applies on the assumed level of features.