The beyond must also be useful: the burden of alternative approaches.
Eric P Charles, Martin Dege
Integrative psychological & behavioral science June 2008 DOI: 10.1007/s12124-008-9064-9 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that cognitivism's explicit mind-as-computer model gives it a false sense of concreteness and pragmatic usefulness, while alternatives like phenomenology suffer a false sense of ambiguity because their models are implicit. Contends that harsh criticism by alternative approaches alienates potential sympathizers and fosters a take-sides professional attitude; alternatives such as Flores-González's would contribute more if they became immediately useful and less adversarial. |
Abstract
Advocates of many different approaches have, for years, attempted to usurp cognitive psychology's dominance in the field of psychology. Unfortunately, none of these approaches have yet made a convincing case that they could take cognitive psychology's place. Because of its explicit use of the mind-as-computer model, cognitivism gains a false sense of concreteness, and becomes pragmatically useful. Because their models are implicit, alternatives, such as phenomenology, gain a false sense of ambiguity and lose their pragmatic potential. In addition, alternative theories often alienate potential sympathizers through unnecessarily harsh criticism. This leads to a professional attitude in which one must take sides, rather than an attitude that appreciates the benefits of diversity, and may lead to the emergence of other beneficial models. If alternative approaches, such as Dr. Flores-González's (Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Sciences, 2008), could push through to the point of immediate usefulness, and present themselves in a less adversarial way, they would be much better placed make meaningful contributions.