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Mind Back to Life

Juan Manuel Martínez García

Revista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Ciencia April 18, 2026 DOI: 10.18270/rcfc.4705 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Cognitive sciences Cognitivism Representationalism Functionalism Enactivism
Key points Argues that cognitivism's dominance has hindered alternative paradigms and that enactivism offers a promising path for cognitive science.

Abstract

The computationalist paradigm in cognitive science, currently known as cognitivism, has exerted a philosophical and empirical dominance that has hindered the visibility and contemplation of contemporary alternative paradigms such as those proposed by the Cognition 4E school. To encourage the exploration of these new theoretical currents, this work aims to analyze the conceptual assumptions of cognitivism and to criticize two of its central tenets (representationalism and functionalism). In this way we hope to obtain a philosophical justification of enactivism, its theoretical foundations and methodological implications as a promising path within the cognitive sciences.